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Abstract: 
Behavioral patterns in media consumption are changing. With the upcoming of 
video-on-demand platforms, so-called ‘binge-watching’ gained broad awareness. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first economic analysis explicitly on binge-
watching. We approach the phenomenon by arguing that it follows fundamental 
patterns of addictive behavior. By applying concepts of rational addiction and be-
havioral economics, we derive (i) a theoretical understanding of binging-watching 
behavior and (ii) factors increasing the likelihood of binging, especially with mod-
ern technologies and digital media services. The decision to binge depends on indi-
vidual factors such as the accumulation rate of consumption capital (speed of 
learning and acquiring knowledge), opportunity costs, and the expected value of 
consumption. Consumption capital in the form of specific knowledge positively in-
fluences marginal utility. Moreover, binge-watching is not specific to online stream-
ing services (video-on-demand), but modern platforms facilitate certain factors 
which increase the consumers’ engagement. Non-linear, self-organized video 
scheduling and a single narrative (coherent plot) increase the likelihood for con-
sumers to binge. 
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1. Introduction 
‘Binging’ usually relates to an excessive indulgence of eating or the consumption of 
alcoholic beverages, as in ‘binge drinking’ or ‘binge eating’. The specific form of 
binging as in ‘binge-watching’ refers to excessive consumption of audiovisual con-
tent. In contrast to drinking bouts and hedonistic excesses, binge-watching is asso-
ciated with recent technological changes and modern developments.  
In times of digitization, media markets are quickly changing – on demand and sup-
ply side. Technological progress, above all the availability of broadband internet, 
enabled the development of online video consumption and streaming. Video on 
demand (VoD) services like Netflix or Amazon Prime offer individual, non-linear (i.e. 
without fixed programming schedule) access to video content, allowing consumers 
flexible consumption routines. The overall demand for online video content is con-
stantly increasing in industrialized countries,1 shifting from traditional TV to online 
streaming (Budzinski & Lindstädt-Dreusicke 2020; Mikos 2016; Budzinski et al. 
2019). Especially young consumers adjust to flexible ways of consumption and pre-
fer to choose time and place themselves (Steiner & Xu 2018).2 This self-
administration and independent video scheduling combined with the flat rate 
availability of content ‘on demand’ allows consumers to binge-watch through 
hours of series and films. However, is binge-watching really a new phenomenon, 
initiated by recent changes in the media industry or just a new buzzword for an old 
phenomenon?  
The body of literature on binge-watching3 provided by different media scholars is 
growing in recent times, most of them focusing on finding a definition and/or un-
derstanding consumer motivation  (inter alia, Jenner 2014, 2016; Pena 2015; 
Pittman & Sheehan 2015; Deloitte 2016; Mikos 2016; Steiner 2017; Rubenking et 
al. 2018; Sung et al. 2018; Merrill & Rubenking 2019). To some degree, excessive 
video consumption and TV addiction is no revolutionary new phenomenon (Matrix 
2014; Godinho de Matos & Ferreira 2017; Petersen 2016; Merikivi et al. 2018), since 
                                                          
1  A representative German study in 2018 shows that 60 percent of respondents use online videos 
weekly (n = 2,009)  (Kupferschmitt 2018:428). 
2  See e.g. Statista (2018) for numbers in the US. 
3  For a detailed literature review see Steiner & Xu (2018). 
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some people have always spent more time in front of the television than they in-
tended to and repeatedly try to reduce the consumed amount (Kubey & Csikszent-
mihalyi 2002). Whereas former ‘couch potato behavior’ like TV indulgence has a 
negative and harmful connotation (as also the linguistics ‘binge’ implies), binge-
watching behavior seems to have gained social acceptance. In scientific studies, 
positive and negative aspects of binge-watching are mentioned, emphasizing its’ 
ambiguity (Steiner & Xu 2018; Rubenking et al. 2018). According to Steiner (2017) 
it is a bilateral hybrid change in technology and culture. “It is a symbolic rearticula-
tion of audience control ironically performed by audiences losing control on their 
own terms.” (Steiner & Xu, 2018: 4).  
By formalizing binge-watching in an economic model, we logically examine impact 
factors from a primarily positive (non-normative) perspective. Yet, we find that be-
havioral economics provide suitable approaches to the ‘element of regret’ repeat-
edly mentioned but not formalized in media literature. Therefore, we attempt to 
answer the research question: What factors drive binge-watching behavior and can 
economic concepts explain this phenomenon? In this paper, we analyze the mech-
anisms of binge-watching from an economic point of view and, thus, the factors 
influencing consumer behavior. It is a detailed and comprehensive study of the dif-
ferent determinants, which should also show to what degree it actually differs from 
traditional ‘TV overconsumption’. To our best knowledge, it is the first economic 
paper specifically on binge-watching.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the economic literature that 
our analysis builds upon. In the following section 3, we apply economic concepts to 
binge-watching, adapt and extend traditional models and, eventually, retrieve spe-
cific factors, which influence binge-watching behavior. Section 4 discusses the fac-
tors, and section 5 summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical Background  
The premise of our analysis is that elements of binge-watching behavior follow ad-
dictive consumption patterns (not implying serious mental/health issues but regard-
ing obsessive consumption). Hence, we see fit in the application of the economic 
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theory of consumption capital, based on the seminal work on taste building and 
addiction by Stigler & Becker (1977). We associate their concept of consumption 
capital and its role in consumers decisions to the advancements of Adler (1985). To 
understand the addictive dynamic of binge-watching, and to derive an analysis of 
the driving factors of binge-watching behavior, we employ the theoretical frame-
work of rational addiction primarily advanced by Becker & Murphy (1988), and 
Becker, Grossmann, & Murphy (1991). To extend the economic validity of our dis-
cussion, we consider behavioral economics on addictive consumption patterns and 
binging behavior (Chaloupka et al. 1999; Vuchinich & Heather 2007). 
Marshall (1890), Stigler & Becker (1977) as well as Adler (1985) agree that there is a 
dynamic component to the concept of marginal utility. Individuals can develop a 
positive taste for a good, and therefore the marginal utility derived from consump-
tion of this good can change over time (Stigler & Becker 1977). Preferences evolve 
when previous knowledge is important for consumption, and “the more you know 
the more you enjoy” (Adler 1985). In the model of Stigler & Becker (1977) as well 
as Adler (1985), and Becker & Murphy (1988), consumption behavior is assumed to 
rely on stock building through consumption, the accumulation of consumption 
capital. Stigler & Becker (1977) built upon the idea of consumption capital in their 
seminal work on taste and addiction, by introducing the concept of consumption 
capital to rational consumer choice theory. Consumption capital theory does not 
refute the assumption of diminishing marginal utility, but rather expands on it by 
delivering an explanation for a multitude of consumer behaviors in art, drugs, and 
media consumption. We apply the concept of consumption capital to binging be-
havior in media consumption. 
In consumption capital theory, past consumption has an impact on future con-
sumption. Current consumption increases future consumption by influencing mar-
ginal utility positively over time, rising over time because tastes shifts in their favor 
(Stigler & Becker 1977). The degree to which past consumption increases current 
consumption defines the addictive qualities of a good.  Addictive goods have adja-
cent complementarity (Becker & Murphy 1988). This is to say that quantities of con-
sumption over time, e.g. present and future consumption are complementary. Cur-
rent quantity and quantities in the future are consumed in dynamic conjunction, 
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and rational behavior is an individual’s maximization of utility over time, incorpo-
rating the interdependence of past, current and future consumption into the utility 
maximization process. In Adler’s (1985) work, consumption capital matters for con-
sumption where it consists of specific knowledge.  The acquisition of the specific 
knowledge for the accumulation of consumption capital occurs in three possible 
ways: (i) exposure to the good itself (Stigler & Becker 1977), (ii) through network 
effects e.g. discussions about it with friends including gossip (commonality effects; 
Adler 1985), (iii) information through media coverage, reading about it online or 
offline etc. (Adler 2006). 
In all the mentioned models of consumption capital, individuals are actively partici-
pating in the consumption process of commodities by combining goods provided 
by the market with their own investments to maximize their utility. The individuals’ 
utility is determined by their investment of their own time, skills, training and other 
human capital into the objects of choice (Michael & Becker 1973). This induces a 
maximization problem where individuals face not only monetary restrictions, but 
also ones of time and other human resources, therefore inducing a time allocation 
problem (Becker 1965).  
As time passes without consumption, the built up stock of consumption capital 
dissipates (Stigler & Becker 1977; Vuchinich & Heather 2007). It is therefore easier 
to develop a taste (or an addiction for that matter) when frequency of consump-
tion is high or the depreciation rate on the built-up stock of consumption capital is 
relatively low (Becker & Murphy 1988). Since time intervals between consumption 
are short, the depreciation of positive capital stock only occurs in a very short time 
span, and the rate of depreciation loses relevance for decision-making. Rapid con-
secutive consumption followed by phases of abstinence (withdrawal) specify bing-
ing behavior. Binging behavior is more likely if an individual can later terminate a 
high level of addiction by an investment in withdrawal. If the consumer´s decision 
of high addiction is reversible to the original degree of addiction, with low costs of 
combating the addiction, then a strategy of binging is optimal for maximizing utili-
ty over time (Clarke & Danilkina 2006). This stands in contrast to myopic models of 
addictive behavior, where future values are disregarded completely in the con-
sumption decision (Vuchinich & Heather 2007).  
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In Stigler & Becker´s model, addicts are “happy addicts”. They choose their addic-
tion after rationally considering all alternatives and never regret their decisions. 
Stigler & Becker (1977) themselves raise omission of time preferences as limitations 
to their model. Time inconsistency, self-control issues and feelings of regret are not 
accounted for (Akerlof 1991; Clarke & Danilkina 2006). To account for this common 
objection, Orphanides & Zervos (1995) introduced a model of rational addiction in 
which the probability of getting addicted is unknown to the individual. Individuals 
gamble on whether they get “hooked” through assessing their addictive potential a 
priori4. Addiction is the “[…] unintended occasional outcome of experimenting 
with an addictive good known to provide certain instant pleasure and only proba-
bilistic future harm”. With this, individuals can regret their addictive decision when 
they were convinced, they would not be among the group that loses control over 
their consumption. Considering the literature, however, the loss of control causing 
binging behavior and possible feelings of regret after binging are underexplored in 
economic literature (Chaloupka et al. 2014). 
We build on this idea and introduce an element of regret to the economic frame-
work of binging behavior. We employ the concept of expected utility versus real-
ized utility to explain dissatisfaction from individual consumption decisions. Under 
uncertainty, individuals optimize the expected utility of consumption. In expected 
utility theory, individuals assign a subjective utility factor to the statistically ex-
pected value of an outcome5 (Bernoulli 1954). Individuals who become addicts 
therefore can rationally optimize their expected utility, including future utility. 
However, expected utility can differ from actually obtained experienced utility. If 
experienced utility falls short of the expected utility level, this is perceived as a loss, 
and this causes disappointment (Kahneman & Tversky 1979). The individual´s risk-
aversion determines the weight of this loss (Tversky & Kahneman 1992). The com-
parison of the experienced utility level versus the complete price of consumption 
causes regret. This element of regret occurs since the initial decision was based on 
                                                          
4  The common objections in the application of a rational addiction framework therefore mostly 
relate to the implicit assumption of perfect foresight, not rational choice itself.  
5  We assume that addicts optimize expected utility with a Bayesian interpretation of probability, 
meaning they interpret probability as a reasonable expectation based on their state of 
knowledge and a quantification of personal belief (Cox 1946). 
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the cost/benefit of the expected utility level. Willingness-to-pay for the level of real-
ized experienced utility might be lower than the full-price paid.  
 
3.  The Economics of Binge-Watching 
3.1 Economic Model and Conceptual Framework 
With binge-watching behavior, we observe similar dynamics of obsessive behavior 
found in rational addiction theory. Therefore, we build on the landmark model of 
Stigler & Becker (1977). In our discussion, we differentiate between two states of 
consumption: the time of actual consumption (i.e. watching video content) and the 
time gap between consumptions (i.e. breaks between video sittings). 
For both commodities c (video content) and x (all other commodities), the derived 
utility is dependent on the consumers’ investment in time (time allocation).  is the 
individual’s decision for consumption of the capital building good (watching), 
whereas  is the consumption of all other commodities, and the individual is faced 
with the decision of consumption of either ( ). We model the period of 
consumption as the interval between the decisions, to watch ( ) and the decision 
to do something else ( . The first period of consumption (i.e. first decision to con-
sume until first decision to do something else) is , the first period of non-
consumption . In general, the consumption period is  and non-
consumption .  is a concave function and the utility of an individual, de-
pending on the time allocation between c and x. 
(1)  
Consumers gather consumption capital by watching video content. They acquire 
information about content, characters, genre etc. and increase their specific 
knowledge. In the first period of consumption, the consumer has not acquired any 
consumption capital, yet. Within this first period, the individual acquires consump-
tion capital , depending on the consumption time . The more time the 
consumers spends watching video content, the more consumption capital she can 
acquire.  is the speed of learning, or accumulation rate in i.  represents the 
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maximum level of knowledge that can be acquired (see figure 1 for illustration). In 
the consumption period, we assume that , as time and rate of learning can 
only be positive. Also the overall level of consumption , since knowledge can 
only be increased during consumption (not reduced, as in “forgetting content”). 
(2)  
 
Figure 1:  Changing Consumption Capital for  
𝜆𝑖
𝑐 = 1
𝒕𝒊
𝒄
𝛽𝑖
𝑐
𝜆𝑖
𝑐 = 2𝑪𝒊𝒄
 
The accumulation of consumption capital depends on  and  (figure 1), which are 
functions of endogenous factors , and the exogenous factor .  
(3) ) 
(4) ) 
Endogenous factors refer to the specific individual and are part of her human 
capital, i.e. the speed  and total capacity  of learning and retrieving knowledge, 
understanding narrative strands of audiovisual content, remembering different 
characters or facts etc. The exogenous factor  means that some contents are 
more suitable to acquire specific knowledge with continuous use. For instance, the 
knowledge of different characters of a series with coherent plot is more useful in 
the long run (and over various episodes and sittings) than knowing the characters 
of a feature film without subsequent episodes. Therefore, contents with high  
have high adjacent complementarity and faster increase , and in total more  
accumulation of consumption capital. Both variables can vary over different periods 
(i.e. later consumption periods might have diminishing returns). 
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In the following break between sittings, the individual chooses to consume x rather 
than c. The consumption capital acquired during the first sitting, , changes to . 
It is a function of the consumption capital of the previous period , the non-
consumption period  and, again, the factors  and . In contrast to the 
consumption period, during non-consumption, the sign of  can also be negative 
(“forgetting” during non-consumption). The growth or reduction of consumption 
capital is limited to  and the rate of growth or reduction depends on .  
(1)  
For , consumption capital increases, i.e. through thinking about the content, 
developing new ideas or theories and joyful anticipation. Positive network effects (à 
la Adler 1985, 2006), i.e. talking to friends, reading about the series etc. can also 
play a role here. The consumption capital stays unchanged , if the consump-
tion specific knowledge is not reduced or increased. Consumption capital can de-
crease , if consumers forget contents, characters, plots and facts over time, 
or content is not memorable, hence, in the course of time reducing the acquired 
consumption capital of previous consumption. See figure 2 for an illustration of the 
process. 
 
Figure 2: Changing Consumption Capital for  
𝜆𝑖
𝑥 = 1
𝒕𝒊
𝒙
𝜆𝑖
𝑥 = 2𝑪𝒊𝒙 + 𝜷𝒊𝒙
𝑪𝒊
𝒙
𝑪𝒊
𝒙 − 𝜷𝒊
𝒙
𝜆𝑖
𝑥 = 1
𝜆𝑖
𝑥 = 2
 
With  the sign of  changes the net outcome 
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A positive  increases the consumption capital over time, which means that 
. For consumers and content with increasing consumption capital it is utility 
maximizing not to binge watch but watch video contents in separate sessions. The 
‘desire’ and joyful anticipation before the next consumption unit provide an incen-
tive for partitioning. 
 
 means that  is independent of the time period that  is not con-
sumed. For consumers or content features with stable consumption capital, the 
time between video sittings [  is not decisive. In these cases, it does not mat-
ter whether recipients watch all the way through or leave time in between con-
sumption points. 
 
A negative  decreases the consumption capital over time, which means that 
. Since consumption capital translates into future utility of consumption, it 
is utility maximizing to keep the term  small. This means, it is a 
rational choice to keep the time between consumptions as short as possible to op-
timize utility by maximizing consumption capital and, hence, to binge watch video 
content.  
During subsequent video sittings, the consumer builds upon her previously ac-
quired knowledge (consumption capital of the first session +/- changes during the 
break), with past consumption increasing future utility. Therefore, our model as-
sumes that current utility also depends on a measure of past consumption. 
(2)  
Or in general for n periods of consumption and non-consumption 
(3)  
(4)  
Eventually, in all subsequent periods, the consumption capital has to be taken into 
account. Utility is, thus, depending on the accumulated time of consuming , 
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former consumption capital , and the accumulative time spent consuming all 
other commodities . 
(5)  
When it comes to individual utility, the price of consumption (full-price ) has to be 
taken into account. The consumer’s cost of consumption is the combined (i) total 
monetary cost (i.e. to acquire access to video content, e.g. subscription/transaction 
fees) and (ii) time invested in consumption (Adler 1985). Thus, the ‘full-price’  of 
current consumption is comprised of the present price and money value of changes 
in future utility and earnings (Becker & Murphy 1988). Consequently, the biggest 
driver to the full-price of consuming video content is opportunity cost. Excessive 
video consumption takes a lot of time, which could be spend with various other 
activities.  
The utility from the consumption of a marginal unit of content is the derivative 
function of , or . To make a decision to keep watching or to quit watching, 
an individual needs to estimate the expected marginal utility of additional content. 
This is expressed through the estimated marginal utility . In every consumption 
period,  is the expected level of marginal utility from the consumption in the 
next period. An individual forms expectations about the utility they will gain from 
watching the next episode and compares it to the estimated marginal cost of this 
consumption ), as in its estimation of the full-price. This is the cost/benefit 
consideration of binge-watching. An individual will make the decision to keep 
watching if the expected marginal utility of continued watching exceeds the esti-
mated marginal cost ( ), and will stop watching if otherwise 
( . 
However, expected marginal utility and cost of consumption may actually deviate 
from true/de facto marginal utility and cost. 
(6)  
(7)  
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This is a fundamental result of the characteristic of media goods as experience 
goods. You cannot gauge the quality of a media good before consuming it, and 
therefore you can never know if you will like it, thus your utility derived from its 
consumption is unknown and must be estimated. This comparison of expected 
marginal utility to experienced utility is relevant in the decision to binge-watch: if 
experienced marginal utility from consumption of this unit of content exceeds the 
expected utility , the probability of addictive behavior increases.  
However, if experienced marginal utility from consumption of the marginal unit 
falls short of the level of expected marginal utility ( ), the individual 
has made an unfavorable decision to keep watching, which causes regret and re-
sentment. Expectations for the next episode can be high because of cliffhangers, 
series finales or a consistently high quality of previous episodes. A “letdown” epi-
sode might just make individuals reconsider their binging behavior. In case of a 
mismatch of utility from consumption versus costs, individuals will positively misin-
terpret utility due to a confirmation bias of their investment, and keep consuming 
up to a certain threshold (threshold effect). This can lead to the termination of con-
sumption, because losses are over-weighted in decision-making (Tversky & Kahne-
man 1992). The individual regrets its decision based on a shortcoming of actualized 
experienced utility versus the expected marginal utility , as the will-
ingness-to-pay for this lower level of utility is presumably lower than in the primary 
consideration. Furthermore, the full-price might be higher than expected 
 and the consumer eventually perceives it as overpayment (relative 
price-benefit ratio). After continued watching to the point of binge-watching, it 
becomes painfully clear that the time could have been spend more efficiently, do-
ing other things (consuming  rather than , e.g. household tasks). Therefore, after 
actually knowing the utility derived from consumption and readjusting the individ-
ual perspective, the consumer might realize that, de facto, marginal costs exceeded 
experienced marginal utility . The previously chosen time allocation 
between  and  was suboptimal and opportunity costs of consumptions were 
higher than expected. This time inconsistent decision-making causes resentment 
and regret.  
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3.2 Discussing the Economics of Binge-Watching 
 
There are multiple definitions of binge-watching available in the literature. In con-
trast to (qualitative or in-depth) approaches of other social sciences, we want to 
simplify specifications and reduce complexity, to understand the basic mechanisms 
and problems behind the phenomenon. Therefore, we compile common elements 
of the discussion around binge-watching and connect them to our model (chapter 
3.1). Repeatedly mentioned characteristics of binge-watching are: the consumption 
of audiovisual content of (a) a single program (sometimes strictly defined as series 
only), (b) in a non-linear way (self-administration), (c) over an extensive period of 
time, (d) focused and uninterrupted in one sitting, often including (e) an element 
of regret and self-harm. (inter alia, Merikivi et al. 2018; Merrill & Rubenking 2019; 
Mikos 2016; Pena 2015; Rubenking et al. 2018; Deloitte 2016; Steiner & Xu 2018; 
Sung et al. 2018; Jenner 2016). 
 
a) ), ): An element repeatedly found in the literature is the 
restriction to a single program or narrative; understood as serialized content 
or the genre “series” (inter alia, Pena 2015; Jenner 2016). This actively ex-
cludes watching various different contents within one sitting i.e. combining 
different films one after the other or switching between series. Consequent-
ly, watching eight hours of Netflix and switching though different episodes 
and films would (under this restriction) not be considered binge-watching. 
Applying economic theory in the context of our model, on the one hand, (i) 
series are specifically suitable for marathon watching, especially when con-
taining continuous plots, cliffhangers and developing characters. Sticking to 
one series increases the addictive character and the likelihood to get hooked 
on a topic, since the consumer is able to accumulate more specific consump-
tion capital C (specific investments; cannot be transferred to other contents). 
Serialized content increases the addictive qualities of the content  and 
therefore the speed ( ) and total amount ( ) of building consumption cap-
ital and, thus, future utility. Consequently, when the last available season of 
a series ends, consumers are able to terminate their binging behavior at rela-
14 
 
tively low cost (Clarke & Danilkina 2006). On the other hand, (ii) the accumu-
lation speed  and the maximum level of consumption capital  also depend 
on the individual internal factor . Extensive video consumption of the ev-
er-same story might bore some consumers and stimulate the initiative to 
switch genre, platform, or both. For variety-seeking consumers or consumers 
with heterogeneous preferences, the personal  would decrease in the 
process, as they get bored and stop paying attention. In this moment, de-
pending on specific utility functions, some consumers stop watching, search-
ing for new stimuli. They would switch between offers to satisfy the respec-
tive needs (keep  and  high). The act of binge-watching is consequent-
ly not restrictively limited to a specific genre or platform. If a consumer has a 
strong preference for staying in front of the screen and consuming further 
videos, she will do so. Variety-seeking heavy users, hence, maximize their in-
dividual utility and freely choose to get entertained by television, VoD or 
even advertising financed VoD like YouTube and binge watch hours of video 
content in one sitting. Summary a): Serial content increases  and conse-
quently the probability of binge-watching, but binge-watching behavior is 
not generally limited to a specific genre or platform.  
 
b) Consumers choose time gap  between videos freely depending on 
the sign of : In contrast to traditional TV, VoD services provide the possi-
bility of self-organized, non-linear video consumption. Consumers are flexi-
ble to decide what to watch and, in this case more importantly, when to 
watch. The availability of (continuous) content in a structure of self-
administration gives recipients the choice of binge-watching throughout the 
desired content. Unlike traditional TV, the program does not have to be ad-
justed to a pooled target group, but only to personal preferences. Therefore, 
consumers do not have to wait a day/week etc. to watch the next episode or 
sequel. Instead, they choose the time gap (as in the interval   freely 
(i.e. the time gap is internalized to the individual’s decision-making; before, 
it was externally set by the program schedule). Depending on the sign of , 
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it can be favorable to binge-watch (if ) and minimize the period of 
consumption of , before choosing to consume  again). Consump-
tion capital of the previous consumption can decrease, if consumers forget 
characters, plots or the content is not catchy and memorable. Engaging in 
binge-watching, consumption capital  builds up quicker, than if they had to 
wait another week for the next episode of their favorite TV-show to air. A 
strong preference for the present (myopic) and  (see 3.1) explains, 
why binge-watching is preferred over spacing out the consumption over 
time, e.g. watching one episode every day. Eventually, although TV addic-
tions or the ‘over-consumption of video content in an obsessive manner’ is 
nothing particularly new, the likelihood to get stuck in an addictive watching 
circle has increased with the efficiency of modern streaming services 
(small/flexible time gaps, quick accumulation of ). Summary b): Modern 
technologies allow self-administration and non-linear consumption 
(small/flexible ), increasing the probability of binge-watching (if 
). 
 
c) Platforms minimizing time between sittings : The focused consump-
tion refers to the actual act of watching the content, rather than only using 
television as side entertainment or background ‘noise’. Serial consumption, 
uninterrupted in one sitting, translates into continuous repetition of con-
sumption decisions. The number of videos and frequency of usage consid-
ered in the literature (Pierce-Grove 2017; Sung et al. 2018) mean the repeat-
ed decision-making of consuming the next unit in rapid succession. 
(Re)deciding to continue watching (over and over again) is therefore referred 
to as a defining characteristic of a binge session. Once one episode, film or 
clip ended, the consumer decides to continue. Platform characteristics like 
smart recommender systems and auto-play formats decrease the time in-
between consumption decisions and make it harder to decide actively 
against further consumption. Content providers have an incentive to keep 
the consumers on the platform, using sophisticated algorithms (Budzinski & 
16 
 
Lindstädt-Dreusicke 2020; Gaenssle & Budzinski 2019). This reduces the time 
to reconsider the full-price  of future consumption (possible opportunity 
costs or appropriate discount rates of future utility), increasing the probabil-
ity of continuing (see point d for further full-price argumentation). In tradi-
tional TV or DVD,  was longer, e.g. changing DVDs, and only heavy 
users continued watching. Modern platform characteristics therefore in-
crease the probability of binge-watching by decreasing the breaks between 
videos. Summary c): Modern technologies decrease the break between vide-
os , reducing the time to reconsider the full-price of future consump-
tion, thus, increasing binge-watching behavior.   
 
d) High , low full-price : The question what constitutes a video session as 
a binge (how many videos, for how long/extensive period of time) is crucial, 
yet, difficult. Past studies diverge in stating that 2-4h of the same show 
(Smith-Frigerio 2016; Petersen 2016) or rather the number of episodes 
(Pierce-Grove 2017) are an accurate delineator of binge-watching. A survey 
conducted by Netflix in 2013 states that 73 percent of participants define 
binge-watching as watching between 2-6 episodes of a TV show, while 61 
percent of them regularly engage into binging (Netflix 2013; Rubenking et 
al. 2018). Considering the full-price  and thereby the time  invested by the 
consumer, the mere number of videos seems inappropriate to calculate the 
cost of consumption and its effects. For instance, comparing three 20-
minute sitcom episodes of ‘The Big Bang Theory’ to three episodes of ‘Game 
of Thrones’ at approximately 60-70 minutes each means 1h versus 3h. Con-
sequently, the number of videos, and thus, the number of consumption de-
cisions, but also the overall time invested in consumption is decisive, since 
the time makes up a majority of  paid by the consumer. Depending on the 
consumer’s occupation, age and responsibilities, opportunity costs vary a lot. 
Low opportunity costs decrease the full-price , hence demand increases. 
Consumers with small  are consequently more likely to binge-watch. The 
flat rate pricing models commonly used by VoD streaming services decrease 
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monetary cost per unit and increase the importance of opportunity costs in 
. The monthly paid flat rate price could be considered fixed costs independ-
ent of quantity, or even sunk costs (Tversky & Kahneman 1992; Train et al. 
1987). From a behavioral economics perspective, by bypassing the individu-
al’s loss aversion of having to buy single episodes, flat rate pricing facilitates 
binge-watching. Summary d): Low full-price (especially opportunity costs) in-
crease the demand and watching-interval  and likelihood for binge-
watching. Flat rate pricing models further facilitate binge-watching. 
  
e) , marginal cost exceeding marginal utility: Addictive consumption 
habits often come with an element of dissatisfaction or regret, when people 
spend more time than they intended to or try to reduce their consumption. 
Recent studies on consumer behavior show that binge-watchers feel power-
less and defeated when they consumed more episodes than they originally 
intended to (Perks 2015; Feijter et al. 2016; Flayelle et al. 2017; Walton-
Pattison et al. 2018). Drawing from expected utility theory, an individual 
makes a decision to continue consuming based on the expected utility of the 
next unit of video content. Their expectation of how good it will be drives 
people to watch the next episode. Due to experience good characteristics, 
consumers cannot know the quality of the next unit of video consumption 
and have to estimate it. If the actualized utility of consuming the next epi-
sode does not match the expected utility, it in hindsight might not warrant 
the investment of the full-price. A thoughtful cost-benefit assessment might 
need more than a view seconds between videos. Platform characteristics 
(point c), which shorten the time between videos, make a conscious and 
time-consistent decision more difficult. The harsh reality of opportunity cost 
of overconsumption becomes painfully clear in later periods, causing regret 
and indicating dynamic inconsistency of preferences, i.e. realizing missed re-
sponsibilities and to-dos after a whole day of binge-watching. A study by 
Riddle et al. (2018) differentiates between intentional and unintentional 
watching behavior. Putting this in context of our model, the consumer inten-
tionally plans a period of consumption, choosing a time span with (i) low 
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opportunity cost e.g. in the evening and (ii) maximizes utility according to 
personal preferences i.e. watching with the partner or friends, or using the 
consumption period as reward for accomplished work etc. For such inten-
tional/planned consumption, the estimation of cost versus utility is more ac-
curate to the true (actualized) values, because it is easier for an individual to 
estimate opportunity costs and utility of consumption when making a con-
scious decision, rather than unintentionally binging (getting stuck). Hence, 
unintentional binge-watching is more likely to cause subsequent regret and 
time-inconsistent behavior; the result of actualized experienced utility falling 
short of expected utility and, marginal costs exceeding marginal utility in ret-
rospect. Summary e): Experience good characteristics necessitate a pre-
consumption estimation of future cost and utility ( ). An ele-
ment of regret can be caused, if actualized costs exceed actualized utility 
( ). Conscious decisions and intentional binge-watching can 
minimize this element of regret.   
Summing up all factors, which increase the likelihood of binge-watching: 
 
Table 1: Factors increasing Likelihood of Binge-Watching 
Factor Variable Explanation Role of New Technologies  
(increasing probability of 
binge-watching) 
Individual (inter-
nal) factor of 
human capital 
High  in con-
sumption of  
 
Speed and total amount of 
knowledge the consumer can acquire. 
If an individual quickly accumulates a 
lot of knowledge, this increases con-
sumption capital and utility (likeli-
hood of binge-watching). 
 
 
External factor 
of content 
High  in con-
sumption of  
 
For some contents specific knowledge 
can be accumulated more rapidly e.g. 
serialized content with continuous 
plots, which fuels binge-watching.  
↑ serial content 
↑ flat rate availability 
 
 
 reduces consumption capital 
while not consuming  (forgetting 
content, facts, etc.) therefore it is 
favorable to binge-watch content. 
 
 
Price of con-
sumption/ op-
portunity cost 
Low full-price  
 
If an individual has low opportunity 
costs, it increases the probability of 
making a decision to watch   and, 
thus, binge-watching behavior. 
Flat rate pricing facilitates binge-
watching, bypassing the individual’s 
loss aversion of buying single episode. 
↑ flat rate pricing 
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Time intervals 
between con-
sumptions 
Minimizing 
  
if  
(i) The consumer chooses breaks be-
tween sittings  freely in self-
administration. Small time gaps be-
tween sittings (minimizing 
), are favorable if  
to optimize utility 
↑ non-linear programming 
↑ flat rate availability 
↑ availability of full seasons 
 
 (ii) Platforms use different methods to 
minimize break between videos small, 
to keep the consumer on the plat-
form. It is more difficult to reconsider 
properly future cost and utility of 
consumption in such short breaks. 
↑ auto-play functions 
↑ algorithms/recommender 
systems 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
We find that binge-watching follows addictive patterns and therefore rational ad-
diction theory can be applied to the underlying economic decision-making process-
es. We argue that the accumulation of positive consumption capital, shifting mar-
ginal utility positively is a meaningful explanation to binge-watching behavior. Fac-
tors that drive binge-watching are found in a combination of factors internal to 
individuals (inter alia, speed of learning) as well as external factors (content and 
technical factors). Internal factors in our model are the rate of accumulation of spe-
cific knowledge and the individual’s opportunity costs. Low opportunity costs of 
individuals are a major driver in binge-watching behavior, because they account for 
a large share of the full-price of consumption. Consumers, who accumulate specific 
knowledge about media content faster gather consumption capital faster and are 
therefore more likely to binge.  
Our model demonstrates that for some individuals it is rationally utility maximizing 
to binge-watch. For some consumer-content combinations, binge-watching can be 
utility-maximizing, since gaps between video sittings have negative impact on the 
acquired consumption capital e.g. because they lose specific knowledge as they 
forget intricacies of the story or the content is not explicitly memorable. In these 
cases, recipients minimize their loss of consumption capital between sittings by 
minimizing the self-administered time in-between consumptions of non-linear me-
dia content. Other individuals can maximize their utility by spacing out media con-
sumption because it optimizes their consumption capital and therefore marginal 
utility.  
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External factors drive binge-watching behavior. The coherent plot of series and 
content availability lead to a rapid accumulation of consumption capital by con-
sumers. Additionally, VoD streaming services minimize the time between consump-
tions by implementing auto-play functions and algorithmic preference matching, 
making it as easy as possible to keep watching. The consumer-administered time 
between consumptions is a major difference to traditional TV where time between 
consumptions was externally dictated by linear media programming, limiting bing-
ing behavior on serial content. Therefore, the technical characteristics of modern 
VoD streaming services and serial media content facilitate binging behavior. The 
phenomenon of binge-watching is not specific to series and does not only occur in 
modern digital media services. Yet, the specific characteristics of serial content and 
technical abilities of video on demand streaming foster binge-watching. 
We extend expected utility theory to explain an element of regret after overcon-
sumption. Regret arises when the utility from the next episode and costs of watch-
ing it do not counterbalance. Due to experience good characteristics of audiovisual 
content, the consumer has to estimate future cost and utility. If actualized utility 
falls short of estimated utility and marginal cost exceed marginal utility, the con-
sumer eventually realizes that she ‘overpaid’. Unintended binge-watching sessions 
(getting stuck) are more likely to end regretting the decision than intentional ones, 
since cost-benefit assessments can be more accurate. Therefore, implications from 
our analysis are that not for all individuals binge-watching is attributed to a loss of 
control, or a failure to make a rational choice.  
From a broader perspective, the seriousness of the phenomenon depends on the 
overall extend of the individual problem. Does the binging behavior come with an 
element of regret? How much time does the consumer actually spend on consump-
tion (i.e. are two episodes really “a problem” and actual “bing-
ing”/overconsumption)? Does binge-watching foster complementary harmful be-
havior (eating excessive calories from junk food while binge-watching or negligence 
of social contacts etc.)? These effects are not taken into account within our model, 
but can increase the cost of consumption, if consumers do not wish to engage into 
such habits or regret past decisions 
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